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Abstract 
Tax evasion remains an issue confronting most policy makers worldwide. Palestine, as an evolving developing 
country highly depends on tax revenue and funds from international aids to finance the country’s growth plan. 
The current study aims at examining relationships between probability of detection, tax penalty, tax rate and 
income tax evasion by applying the Deterrence Theory. A proportionate sampling technique was employed to 
collect data for the study through the use of questionnaires. The total number of useable questionnaires 
collected for analysis was 184. The collected data were analysed using the Partial Least Square (PLS). The result 
of analysed data shows that probability of detection and tax penalty were found to be negatively significant, 
while tax rate was positively significant in relation to income tax evasion. The implication of the findings of the 
current study is that income tax administration effectiveness can maximize tax collections and discourage tax 
evasion. 
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1. Introduction 
Tax revenue is globally regarded as the oldest means of generating funds for sustainability of 
governments and most economies rely on taxation in order to meet up their expenditure needs (Kira, 2017; 
Okauru, 2012). This implies that taxation has been the most realistic means of generating revenue by 
governments for funding their development projects (Tanzi and Zee, 2001). Torgler (2005) revealed that 
numerous factors influence the value of tax revenue generated by the government. One of the vital factors 
is the willingness of taxpayers to comply with the provisions of tax laws. McGee et al. (2008) further 
stressed that 100% compliance with tax regulations is not attainable in any country. The lack of compliance 
to the provisions of tax laws indicates that taxpayers are evading tax (Kirchler, 2007). In this regard, 
Franzoni (2000) asserted that tax evasion is the commonest and most critical challenge of tax 
administration. Tax evasion is any intentional unlawful behaviour of cutting down tax responsibility by the 
taxpayers (Alm et al., 2016). Tax evasion has major implication on tax revenue loss for the government 
(Bott et al., 2017). Similarly, Schneider and Enste (2000) emphasised that revenue losses decreases 
governments’ ability to provide public services, therefore obstructing economic development. 
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Palestine, which is a developing country relies heavily on tax revenue and international aids to fund 
its nation’s growth and development (Alkhatib and Abdul-Jabbar, 2017). In Palestine, the administration of 
income tax is marked by a high level of tax evasion (Rahhal, 2017). In recent times, the Coalition for 
Integrity and Accountability in Palestine estimated that USD 500 million was the annual loss from the 
Palestinian treasury due to tax evasion (Coalition for Accountability and Integrity, 2018). With regards to 
income tax evasion, the Finance Minister emphasized that 80% of society accounts for only 10% of the 
income tax (Bishara, 2015). Even though, SMEs in Palestine make up 99% of business taxpayers, they 
accounted for only 30% of the income tax revenues. This is far less than what is expected to be generated 
from the SMEs (Fallah, 2014). This suggests a high level of engagement in tax evasion by several SMEs 
(Sabri, 2010). With the current level of tax evasion in Palestine, there is need for an in-depth examination of 
the important economic factors that could influence tax evasion in a bid to develop policies to increase 
revenue for the government. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Probability of Detection and Tax Evasion 
Probability of detection implies the likelihood of detecting tax evasion behaviour by the tax 
authorities through the use of its enforcement tools (Alstadsæter et al., 2017; Chau and Leung, 2009). 
According to the economic model, taxpayers attempt to obtain maximum benefits out of their compliance 
decision by comparing the benefits of accomplished tax evasion against the cost of detection and 
punishment. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) therefore affirmed that when the probability of detection is 
high, more proportion of income will mostly be declared. Base on the assumption of risk-averse taxpayers 
implies that an increase in the frequency of audit would decreases tax evasion (Abdixhiku, 2013; Almunia 
and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018). Many existing studies found the correlation between the probability of 
detection and tax evasion to be negative (Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018; Ayers et al., 2015; Bott et 
al., 2017; Slemrod et al., 2001). 
In contrary, the outcome of the study in Israel by Ariel (2012) found that the effect of perceived 
probability of detection along with apprehension on tax evasion to be insignificant. This is in line with the 
findings of another empirical study by Alm and McKee (2006), which also established the insignificant effect 
of audits. Therefore, it can be concluded that most of the studies reported a negative influence of 
probability of detection, while a few of the existing studies found that it has no significant influence. Thus, 
the current study proposes the followings: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between probability of detection and tax evasion. 
 
2.2. Tax Penalty and Tax Evasion 
Tax penalty implies how strict the punishment is in terms of fines and imprisonment linked to the 
detection of tax evasion (Efebera et al., 2004). When a taxpayer is expected to file an income or carry out 
tax a return then fails to comply in time, tax penalties can be charged on such a person for late filing 
(Oladipupo and Obazee, 2016). Allingham and Sandmo (1972) reported that a declaration of larger income 
can be achieved through the increase in the probability of detection and tax penalties. Similarly, Chau and 
Leung (2009) affirmed that tax evasion could be reduced by raising the tax penalties associated with it. In a 
similar study, Feld and Frey (2006) showed that the existence of a severe tax penalty will curtail a number 
of practices of tax evasion. In the same vein, Hasseldine et al. (2007) also confirms that the severity of 
criminal sanctions is significantly associated with tax evasion. 
On the other hand, numerous studies found no support for the deterring effects of tax penalties. Ali 
et al. (2001) found that tax penalties have no impact on tax evasion by analysing tax evasion act of 
American taxpayers. While, Oladipupo and Obazee (2016) found that tax penalty had an insignificant 
negative impact on tax evasion amongst SMEs in Nigeria. Whereas, contrary to the findings of the earlier 
reported studies Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001) conducted a similar study in Tanzania and found that it had 
a positive impact. The previous study also acknowledged that oppressive tax imposition and harassment of 
taxpayers has led to more resistance by pay taxes. Based on the findings of the literature on tax penalties as 
discussed above, it can be concluded that most of the existing studies reported that tax penalties have a 
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negative influence. Only a few studies reported that the influence of penalties is positive and insignificant. 
Thus, the following proposition is made: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between tax penalty and tax evasion. 
2.3. Tax Rate and Tax Evasion 
Tax rate is regarded as the quantity of tax payable by a taxpayer in relation to the taxable item in line 
with the principles of taxation (Mansor and Gurama, 2016). Devos (2007) described tax rate as a vital tax 
structure variable associated with the perception of fairness of the tax system. The Deterrence Theory 
forecasted that rising tax rate reduces tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). In contrast to the theory, 
numerous studies from both developed and developing countries have proven that tax rates are positively 
associated with tax evasion (Dlamini, 2017; Guldana, 2013; Malkawi and Haloush, 2008; Martinez-Vazquez 
and Rider, 2005). Taxpayers consider a high tax rate as an excuse for evading taxes hence; underreport 
their proceeds and earnings to the tax authorities. Rahhal (2017) examined changes in tax rates and the 
effect on tax evasion in Palestine. The study found that the effect of tax rate on tax evasion was positive. In 
a more recent study by Ottone et al. (2018) assessed two countries (Sweden and Italy) characterized by 
high tax rates and found the relationship to be positive.  
In contrary to the findings of the earlier studies reported, a few studies also reported a negative 
relationship between tax rates and tax evasion. These studies includes Adebisi and Gbegi (2013), Nzaro et 
al. (2013) and Olowookere and Fasina (2013), their studies reported a negative relationship between tax 
rate and tax evasion. It can be concluded that most studies found a significant and positive effect of tax rate 
on tax evasion, whereas few studies reported a negative effect on tax evasion. Hence, the following 
hypothesis is derived: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between tax rate and tax evasion. 
 
3. Research framework 
The research model, presented in Figure 1 below was developed based on the economic Deterrence 
Theory. The theory signifies that tax behaviour is influenced by the probability of detection, tax penalty and 
tax rates. Base on the Deterrence Theory, the variation in crime propensity between individuals is 
dependent on the expected benefit or cost rather than the difference in motivation to commit crime. This 










Figure 1. Research Model 
4. Methodology of research 
4.1. Data Collection 
Data for the present study was collected at business entity level, which served as the unit of analysis 
for the present study. The data were obtained from 500 SMEs registered under the Federation of 
Palestinian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. A proportionate random sampling technique was used to 
distribute questionnaires among selected respondents which were the owners/managers of SMEs. The 
questionnaires were distributed for two months and 184 useable data was collected after screening, which 
represents a 37% response rate. 
 
Probability of Detection 
Tax Penalty Tax Evasion 
Tax Rate 
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The entire variables and items used in the current research were adapted from previous studies. A 
five-point Likert-scale was employed to measure the items of the present study ranging from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) for all the variables. The 15 items for measuring tax evasion were adapted 
from Gilligan and Richardson (2005). Reverse coding was used for item 5 in the current study, in order to 
increase the internal validity (Efebera et al., 2004) and this was not applied in the original study by Gilligan 
and Richardson (2005). Probability of detection was measured by 3 items and were adapted from Efebera 
et al. (2004) and tax penalty with 4 items were adapted from James et al. (2005). Tax rate was measured by 
3 items which were adapted from Abdul Jabbar (2009). 
 
5. PLS Data Analysis and Results 
In analysing the research model, the Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis technique was applied by 
using Smart PLS 3 software. The measurement model (the relationship between variable and indicators) 
was analysed using a two stage analytical models as recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988), the 
method was also employed in testing the structural model (relationships between the variables) for the 
current study (Hair et al., 2017). 
 
5.1. Assessment of Measurement Model 
The measurement model is evaluated using 2 measures of validity; the convergent and discriminant 
validity. The convergent validity is assessed analysing the indicators loadings, average variance extracted 
(AVE) and composite reliability. As shown in Table 1 below, the indicator loading for all the items is above 
the minimum threshold of 0.50. The values range from 0.651 to 0.915, the AVE values ranged from 0.501 to 
0.798 and they were also above the recommended value of 0.50, while the composite reliability values also 
ranged from 0.850 to 0.940 which are also above the recommended value of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2017). 
Nevertheless, item numbers 7, 10, 15 for tax evasion were deleted as a result of low indicator loadings. 
Conclusively, based on the outcome, the current study is said to have an acceptable convergent validity. 
Table 1. Convergent validity 
Variables Items Loading CR AVE 
Tax Evasion  TE1 0.725 0.923 0.501 
TE2 0.742   
TE3 0.748   
TE4 0.753   
TE5 0.706   
TE6 0.651   
TE8 0.712   
TE9 0.695   
TE11 0.670   
TE12 0.702   
TE13 0.703   
TE14 0.667   
Probability of Detection  POD1 0.895 0.908 0.766 
POD2 0.814 
POD3 0.915 
Tax Penalty TP1 0.911 0.940 0.798 
TP2 0.879   
TP3 0.889   
TP4 0.893   




Following the establishment of the convergent validity, the next step was the examination of the 
discriminant validity following Hair et al. (2017) criterion. This involved comparing the AVE’s square root 
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values with those of the correlations of the latent variable. As indicated in Table 2, the result showed that 
all the square root of AVE’s are higher in all cases, as were the diagonal values in the respective rows and 
columns. This shows that the adequate discriminant validity is obtained. In general, the outcome of the 
validity tests for the measurement model of the study were found to be satisfactory for both convergent 
and discriminant validity. 
Table 2. Discriminant Validity Analysis 
Variables TE POD TP TR 
Tax Evasion (TE)  0.707    
Probability of Detection (POD) -0.294  0.875   
Tax Penalty (TP) -0.222  0.104  0.893  
Tax Rate (TR)   0.320 -0.180 -0.155 0.809 
 
5.2. Assessment of Structural Model 
The predictive strength of the research model estimated using R-square (R2) (coefficient of 
determination) value explains the joint effect of exogenous and endogenous variables (Hair et al., 2017). 
The Smart PLS algorithm function was employed to measure the R2 value, which is the amount of variance 
accounted for by the exogenous variables (Hair et al., 2017). The three variables had an R2 value of 0.184 
implying that 18.4% of the variation in the income tax evasion is accounted for by probability of detection, 
tax penalty and tax rate. 
Bootstrapping function was applied with 5,000 re-sampling from 184 cases in order to examine the 
significance of the path coefficients (β) using a one-tailed test. Accordingly, the path estimates and t-values 
were measured for all the hypothesized relationships in the present study. Table 3, depicts the analysis 
outcome of the structural model. The outcome showed that the probability of detection (β = -0.232; t = 
3.166; p = 0.001) along with tax penalty (β = -0.158; t = 2.494; p = 0.006) are negatively associated with tax 
evasion, this affirms H1, H2 hypotheses. Furthermore with a significant and positive influence of tax rate on 
tax evasion, H3 is also supported (β = 0.253; t = 3.455; p = 0.000). 
Table 3. Results of Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis: Path Path Coefficient   T-Statistics P-Value Decision 
H1: Probability of Detection -> Tax Evasion -0.232 3.166 0.001** Supported 
H2:  Tax Penalty -> Tax Evasion -0.158 2.494 0.006** Supported 
H3: Tax Rate -> Tax Evasion 0.253 3.455 0.000** Supported 
Note: Significant at **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. 
5.3. Predictive Relevance 
Other than the R2 value, another important statistic value is the Predictive relevance (Q2) which is a 
resampling technique (Henseler et al., 2009). To examine the predictive relevance of the endogenous 
variable, the blindfolding technique was applied with the multiple or single item in reflective measurement 
model (Hair et al., 2017). In accordance with Hair et al. (2017) and Henseler et al. (2009), a cross-validated 
redundancy measure Q2 value which is greater than zero implies the predictive relevance of the model. The 
outcome of this test showed that the present study’s model has predictive relevance for endogenous 
variable as presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Variable Cross-Validated Redundancy (Q²) 
Endogenous latent variable SSO SSE 1-SSE/SSO 
Tax Evasion  2,208.000 2,035.322 0.078 
 
6. Discussions 
The study set out with the objective of assessing the influence of probability of detection, tax penalty 
and tax rate on income tax evasion by SMEs owners/managers. The probability of detection is known to be 
an important deterrent of tax evasion (Park and Hyun, 2003). The present study showed probability of 
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detection significantly and negatively related to income tax evasion. The current study has shown that the 
probability of detection has a significantly negative relationship with income tax evasion. The findings of 
the current study are in agreement with those of other existing empirical literature that also affirmed the 
significant and negative influence of probability of detection on tax evasion (Abdul-Jabbar, 2009; Almunia 
and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018; Ayuba et al., 2016; Bott et al., 2017). This result can be attributed to the fact 
that taxpayers react based on the perception that previous year increase in the sample of businesses 
audited by tax authority could increase the detection of irregularities in the current year audit. In addition, 
taxpayers might weigh the consequence of being audited and penalized due to tax evasion against 
compliance. Thus, resulting into higher income been reported by the taxpayers. 
The threat of tax penalties is considered as an important tool for discouraging tax evasion (Feld and 
Frey, 2006). Accordingly, the current study found that tax penalties have a negative significant effect on 
income tax evasion. Therefore, the result indicates the crucial role that tax penalty plays in influencing the 
decision of SMEs with regards to income tax evasion. Also, the result is consistent with findings of some 
previous studies related to tax penalty and tax evasion (Chau and Leung, 2009; Feld and Frey, 2006; 
Hasseldine et al., 2007). This negative outcome can be attributed to the fact that owners/managers of 
SMEs behave in a rational manner. Since owners/managers are guided by the goal of maximizing the 
expected utility from a tax evasion gamble, they compare the benefits for successful tax evasion with the 
penalty if caught. Thus, SMEs resort to pay taxes as a result of the fear of punishment for income tax 
evasion. 
The tax rate is a vital factor which determines taxpayers’ perceived fairness and equity of the entire 
tax system (Devos, 2007). Tax rate is considered as a measure of the perception of fairness of the tax rate 
structure and burden distribution (Gilligan and Richardson, 2005). The result of the current study supports 
the hypothesis that suggested a positive relationship between tax rate and income tax evasion. The result 
of the present study is consistent with most of the earlier studies that also found a significantly positive 
effect of tax rate on tax evasion (Dlamini, 2017; Freire-Seren and Panades, 2013; Ottone et al., 2018; 
Rahhal, 2017). The present outcome established that the SMEs have a perception that structure of the tax 
rate is unfair, thereby motivating tax evasion. This finding could be justified by the existing tax rate for large 
companies’ in Palestine which is fixed at 15% of taxable profit for a long time. SMEs perceives this to be 
unfair, they think that the larger companies should possess a higher ability to pay income tax, so they are 
expected to pay a higher rate than SMEs. 
 
7. Implications 
The present study is of huge significance in guiding the tax authority towards reducing tax evasion 
among SMEs taxpayers. They make up a vital part of taxpayers in Palestine. Decreasing tax evasion will 
facilitate Palestinian government to decrease the government’s budget deficit and also accomplish fiscal 
sustainability in Palestine. Therefore, the present study recommends that probability of detection, tax 
penalty and tax rate should be targeted by tax administration in the attempt to measure income tax 
evasion considering their predictive strength. SMEs are most likely to comply when they consider that the 
risk of tax evasion is higher than paying taxes legally. It is also recommended that tax authority should 
consider more frequent operational inspections of SMEs alongside enhanced tax auditor efficiency and 
friendly remediation. This implies that the scope of audit coverage by tax authority needs to be expanded 
and training provided for tax auditors with respect to the detection of defaulting SMEs involved in income 
tax evasion. Adopting these recommendations will assist in revealing many tax evaders. Furthermore, a 
more adequate sanction is required to be imposed by the tax authority. SMEs that are resolute income tax 
evaders should be charged, adequately fined and forced to pay the outstanding tax with interest. This 
approach will encourage SMEs owners/managers to pay the income taxes by the due date. SMEs taxpayers 
perceive the present tax rate as unfair. A decrease in the tax rate will increase their income; therefore, they 
achieve more profits that can be used to finance their growth and expansion. Thus, Palestinian tax 
authority needs consideration of the above mentioned issue to have a fair tax rate for SMEs to enhance 
their capacity to pay taxes in the future. 
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8. Limitations and Future Research 
Even though the present study contributed to literature by examining some major determinants of 
income tax evasion, some limitations exist. The main limitation arises from the use of structured 
questionnaires, as it does not represent the honest answers of importers or actual behaviour. Hence, a mix 
method technique is recommended. It involves combining a survey with other forms of qualitative 
techniques that includes case studies and interviews to offer deeper insights and more reliable support 
concerning the findings. Thus, future studies may advance the present study by introducing new 
determinants in addition to the significant determinants in the current research. Future research can also 
consider extending the model to include other unproven factors from socio-psychological factors. 
 
8. Conclusions 
The Palestinian government relies on taxation as one of its sustainable sources of revenue. However, 
the challenge of tax evasion curtailed the ability of the government to maximize expected revenue 
generation from taxation in order to finance developmental projects. The present study is concerned with 
the income tax of SMEs taxpayers, which represents an important part of taxpayers in Palestine. SMEs have 
the potential of a high source of tax revenue generation; but are hindered by a high level of tax evasion. 
Reducing tax evasion by SMEs will help to raise the value of revenue generation by the government. In 
general, the findings of the current research revealed that the probability of detection and tax penalties are 
negatively associated with income tax evasion, while, tax rate is positively associated with income tax 
evasion. However, the present study observed that an existence of effective deterrence can encourage 
taxpayer’s compliance, especially if the risk of detection of evasion is higher than paying taxes. Hence, it is 
suggested that the tax authority should widen their sample of audited taxpayers alongside imposing tough 
tax penalties as a valuable policy aimed at discouraging tax evasion. Furthermore, taxpayers perceive the 
present tax rate as unfair, hence demanding a preference for a progressive tax rate structure. The findings 
of the present study offer a better comprehension of the determinants of income tax evasion. Particularly 
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